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Abstract. Fully homomorphic encryption enables arbitrary computa-
tion on encrypted data without decrypting the data. Here it is studied
in the context of quantum information processing. Based on universal
quantum circuit, we present a quantum fully homomorphic encryption
(QFHE) scheme, which permits arbitrary quantum transformation on
an encrypted data. The QFHE scheme is proved to be perfectly secure.
In the scheme, the decryption key is different from the encryption key,
however, the encryption key cannot be public. Moreover, the evaluate
algorithm of the scheme is independent of the encryption key, so it is
very applicable in delegated quantum computing between two parties.
Keywords: Quantum cryptography, homomorphic encryption, delegated
quantum computing, quantum one-time pad
1 Introduction
Suppose you have some encrypted data, is it possible to compute on the en-
crypted data without decrypting them?
This problem is relative to the research of “delegated computing”. It has been
investigated a lot in modern cryptography, such as homomorphic encryption [1]
and blind computing [2,3]. It was firstly considered by Rivest et al. who suggested
some homomorphic encryption schemes [1]. However, these schemes are insecure
[4]. Later, the fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) schemes [5,6,7] are proposed.
These schemes are constructed based on some hard computational problems, and
their security relies on the computational difficulty of these problems.
Is it possible to solve the above question in the context of quantum infor-
mation? Lots of researches have provided a positive answer in blind quantum
computation [8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17]. Blind quantum computation is a se-
cure cloud quantum computing protocol which enables a client to delegate her
quantum computation to a server without leaking anything about her data, algo-
rithm and result. There are some optimization design [18,19] and experimental
researches [20,21].
This article considers the problem of homomorphic encryption in the con-
text of quantum information processing: suppose arbitrary quantum plaintext σ
has been encrypted, can you perform any quantum operator U directly on the
ciphertext (without decrypting the ciphertext) and the obtained state can be
decrypted and turned into the desired state UσU †?
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Rohde et al. [22] studied quantum walk with encrypted data, and proposed
a limited quantum homomorphic encryption (QHE) scheme using the Boson
sampling and multi-walker quantum walk models. This QHE scheme is applicable
in delegated computing of quantum walk.
Ref. [23] presented the definitions of QHE and quantum fully homomorphic
encryption (QFHE), and constructed a symmetric QFHE scheme. However, in
the scheme, the evaluate algorithm is related to the secret key, so it is not suitable
for secure delegated quantum computing.
In Ref. [24], we proposed a tripartite blind quantum computation (TBQC)
scheme based on universal quantum circuit (UQC). Inspired by the TBQC
scheme, we study the theory of QHE and construct a QFHE scheme based on
UQC. In the scheme, the encryption key and decryption key are different, how-
ever, both of them should be kept secret. The scheme is applicable in delegated
quantum computing, since the evaluate algorithm is unrelated to the secret key.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we firstly introduce the UQC [25,26], quantum one-time pad
(QOTP) [27,28], and then present a new definition of QHE.
Definition 1 (UQC [25]). Fix n > 0 and let U be a collection of unitary
transformations on n qubits. A quantum circuit CU on n+m qubits is universal
for U if, for each transformation U ∈ U , there is a string eU ∈ {0, 1}
m (the
encoding) such that for all strings d ∈ {0, 1}n (the data),
CU (|d〉 ⊗ |eU 〉) = (U |d〉) ⊗ |eU 〉. (1)
From the above definition, the UQC can be expressed as Figure 1.
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Fig. 1. An illustration of universal quantum circuit. The number “n” indicates that
the line represents a bunch of n lines. The ancillary qubits can be seen as a part of the
encoding, so it can be omitted here. In the circuit, the m-qubit output is independent
of the n-qubit result.
In the UQC, given a n qubits d〉 as the input data, when a m qubits |eU 〉
is input as the encoding of a quantum transformation U ∈ U , the UQC would
output n + m qubits CU (|d〉 ⊗ |eU 〉) = (U |d〉) ⊗ |eU 〉. Here, |eU 〉 is called the
encoding of the quantum transformation U ∈ U with regard to the UQC CU .
If there exists a UQC CU for a family of quantum transformations U , then
each quantum transformation U ∈ U has a corresponding encoding |eU 〉, which
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satisfies the relation CU (|d〉 ⊗ |eU 〉) = (U |d〉) ⊗ |eU 〉. If you want to carry out a
series of quantum transformations in U , you only need to know the encodings
of these quantum transformations, and then perform the UQC CU once for each
encoding.
Definition 2 (QOTP [27]). Quantum one-time pad is a symmetric quan-
tum encryption scheme. It is defined by a set { 122n , X
xZz|x, z ∈ {0, 1}n}, which
means each encryption operator XxZz is carried out with the same probabil-
ity 122n . The attacker does not know which encryption operator is used, so the
ciphertext is a completely mixed state 122n I. This means QOTP has perfect
security.
Compared with classical computation, quantum computation is usually more
complex. This indicates that QFHE may be very different from classical FHE.
Thus, an innovation is necessary for the research of QFHE. Here, we present a
new definition about QHE as follows.
Definition 3 (QHE). A QHE scheme has a classical algorithm and three
quantum algorithms: key generating algorithm, encryption algorithm, evaluate
algorithm, and decryption algorithm.
– Key generating algorithm is used to generate two keys: an encryption key ek
and a decryption key dk, where ek is randomly selected and dk is computed
from ek through a given algorithm.
– Encryption algorithm E : ρ = E(ek, σ), where σ is the plain data.
– Evaluate algorithm carries out a quantum computation U on an encrypted
data ρ, and an encrypted result ρ′ is obtained.
– Decryption algorithm D : σ′ = D(dk, ρ′), where σ′ is the plain result. It is
required that σ′ = UσU †.
It is worth to notice that, in the QHE cryptosystem, the encryption key is
different from the decryption key, however, it is not a public key.
A QHE scheme is fully homomorphic, if it allows the evaluate algorithm to
carry out any quantum computation on encrypted data.
3 Schemes
3.1 Quantum homomorphic encryption scheme
In this section, we present a construction of QHE based on a UQC. Here, suppose
there exists a UQC CU for certain family of quantum transformation U , and the
UQC CU is consisted of the quantum gates from the set {X, Y, Z, H, P, CNOT}.
According to the definition of UQC, CU has two input interfaces, containing a
n-qubit interface for data input and a m-qubit interface for encoding input.
Firstly, we introduce the key generating algorithm of the QHE scheme.
The encryption key ek contains two n-bit random strings, which are cho-
sen independently from the set {0, 1}n. To simplify the description later, each
random string is appended m bits 0 · · · 0.The the encryption key is denoted as
ek = (x0, z0), where x0 is a n+m-bit string x0(1)x0(2) . . . x0(n+m) and z0 is also
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a n+m-bit string z0(1)z0(2) . . . z0(n+m). The bits x0(j), z0(j)(n < j ≤ n+m)
are zeroes. So, the encryption key ek has 2n random bits.
The algorithm of computing dk from ek = (x0, z0) is called key-updating
algorithm, which is related to the UQC CU . In the QHE scheme, the construction
of CU is determined in advance. It consists of the quantum gates from the set {X,
Y, Z, H, P, CNOT} by orderly combining several quantum gates. Assume there
are total k quantum gates in the circuit CU , then the key-updating algorithm
can be realized with at most k steps. Denote (xj , zj), j = 1, . . . , k as the key
obtained in the jth step of update. The key (xk, zk) obtained finally is dk. The
key-updating algorithm is the key part of our scheme, and will be proposed later.
Then, we introduce the encryption, evaluate and decryption algorithms of
the QHE scheme.
According to QOTP, the n-qubit data |d〉 is encrypted using the key ek =
(x0, z0) as follows.
|d〉 → (⊗nw=1X
x0(w)Zz0(w))|d〉. (2)
The obtained ciphertext is input into the data interface of the UQC CU , and
the m-qubit encoding |eU 〉 of a quantum transformation U ∈ U is input into
the encoding interface. Then the UQC CU would output the encrypted result as
follows.
CU ((⊗
n
w=1X
x0(w)Zz0(w))|d〉 ⊗ |eU 〉) = (U(⊗
n
w=1X
x0(w)Zz0(w))|d〉) ⊗ |eU 〉. (3)
Later, we will show that the encrypted result U(⊗nw=1X
x0(w)Zz0(w))|d〉 has the
form (up to an irrelevant global phase factor):
(⊗nw=1X
xk(w)Zzk(w))U |d〉, (4)
where (xk, zk) is the decryption key dk.
In the decryption algorithm, the encrypted result is decrypted using the
decryption key dk = (xk, zk) as follows.
U(⊗nw=1X
x0(w)Zz0(w))|d〉
→ (⊗nw=1X
xk(w)Zzk(w))U(⊗nw=1X
x0(w)Zz0(w))|d〉
= U |d〉. (5)
Finally, we show how to update the encryption key ek and obtain the de-
cryption key dk.
According to our assumption, there are k quantum gates in the UQC CU ,
and these quantum gates are labeled as G1, G2, . . . , Gk in accord with the orders
of their execution. Each quantum gate is assumed to be one element of the set
{X, Y, Z, H, P, CNOT}.
– If Gj = X,Y or Z, the key does not change in the jth step of key-updating
algorithm. Let
(xj , zj) = (xj−1, zj−1), (6)
where the assignment “xj = xj−1” means “xj(i) = xj−1(i), i = 1, · · · , n+m”.
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– If Gj = H or P (Assume it acts on the wth qubit, w ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n+m}), the
jth step of key-updating only updates the wth bit of the key. Let (xj , zj) =
(xj−1, zj−1), and then changes the key as follows
let (xj(w), zj(w)) = (zj−1(w), xj−1(w)), if Gj = H ; (7)
let (xj(w), zj(w)) = (xj−1(w), xj−1(w)⊕ zj−1(w)), if Gj = P ; (8)
where the notation “⊕” represents addition modular 2.
– If Gj =CNOT (Assume it acts on the wth and w
′th qubits, where the wth
qubit is the control and the w′th is the target. w,w′ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n +m}),
the jth step of key-updating only updates the wth and w′th bits of the key.
Let (xj , zj) = (xj−1, zj−1), and then changes the key as follows
let (xj(w), zj(w)) = (xj−1(w), zj−1(w) ⊕ zj−1(w
′)), (9)
let (xj(w
′), zj(w
′)) = (xj−1(w)⊕ xj−1(w
′), zj−1(w
′)). (10)
We have the following two results (see Ref. [24]).
1. The following relation holds for each quantum gate Gj ∈ {X,Y, Z,H, P} (up
to an irrelevant global phase factor).
GjX
xj−1(w)Zzj−1(w) = Xxj(w)Zzj(w)Gj . (11)
2. The following relation holds for the gate Gj =CNOT (up to an irrelevant
global phase factor).
Gj(X
xj−1(w)Zzj−1(w) ⊗Xxj−1(w
′)Zzj−1(w
′))
= (Xxj(w)Zzj(w) ⊗Xxj(w
′)Zzj(w
′))Gj . (12)
According to the above two relations, it can be deduced that (up to an irrelevant
global phase factor)
CU ((⊗
n
w=1X
x0(w)Zz0(w))|d〉 ⊗ |eU 〉)
= (⊗n+mw=1 X
xk(w)Zzk(w))CU (|d〉 ⊗ |eU 〉)
= (⊗nw=1X
xk(w)Zzk(w)U |d〉)⊗ (⊗n+mw=n+1X
xk(w)Zzk(w)|eU 〉). (13)
So the cipher state U(⊗nw=1X
x0(w)Zz0(w))|d〉, which is obtained from the quan-
tum computing on the encrypted data, can also be represented as this form
(⊗nw=1X
xk(w)Zzk(w))U |d〉. Thus, the cipher state can be decrypted successfully
with the decryption key dk = (xk, zk).
Until now, we have presented a QHE scheme. The set of quantum gates
{X, Y, Z, H, P, CNOT} is not universal for quantum computation [29,30], and
cannot realize arbitrary quantum computation. When another quantum gate
R =
(
1 0
0 eipi/4
)
is added into the set, it becomes a universal set of quantum
gates {X, Y, Z, H, P, CNOT, R}. Using the universal set of quantum gates, we
can construct a UQC CU for any quantum transformations. Then based on this
UQC, a QFHE scheme can be constructed. The concrete description is shown in
the next section.
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3.2 A quantum fully homomorphic encryption scheme
Given a UQC CU that consists of the quantum gates from the set {X, Y, Z, H, P,
CNOT, R}, assume the UQC can realize any quantum transformation. Because
the construction of the UQC CU contains the R gate, the QFHE scheme based
on the UQC would be different from the QHE scheme in previous section. The
difference is as follows. The encryption and decryption algorithms are the same,
however, some new computation is added into the key-generating algorithm and
evaluation algorithm. The details are shown in the following.
Firstly, it should be noticed that, interactive computation is necessary during
the execution of evaluate algorithm. When the server performs the UQC on
encrypted data, once a R gate has been performed on a qubit (Assume the gate
Gj = R is performed on the wth qubit), then the server sends that qubit to the
client; The client performs quantum operator XrZr
′
P xj−1(w) on the wth qubit,
where r, r′ are two random bits selected by the client, and xj−1(w) is the wth bit
of xj−1 (xj−1 is the client’s key obtained in the (j − 1)th step of key-updating
algorithm).
Note that, the client’s key-updating algorithm is synchronized with the ex-
ecution of the UQC. According to the order of quantum gates in the UQC CU ,
the client updates his keys. Whenever encountering a R gate, he waits for an
interaction with the server. In the process of interaction, the client’s key xj−1(w)
would not be leaked, since he has selected two random bits r, r′ and carries out
a QOTP encryption XrZr
′
.
Then, we introduce the key-updating algorithm. In the process of key-updating,
when Gj = R, let
(xj(w), zj(w)) = (r ⊕ xj−1(w), r
′ ⊕ xj−1(w) ⊕ zj−1(w)), (14)
where r, r′ are two random bits selected by the client. Each time the values of
r, r′ are selected independently.
It can be proved that Gj = R satisfies the following relation (up to an
irrelevant global phase factor).
XrZr
′
P xj−1(w)GjX
xj−1(w)Zzj−1(w) = Xxj(w)Zzj(w)Gj . (15)
According to the relations in Eqs.(11,12,15), it can be deduced that, the output
of the UQC (performed by the server) is
(⊗nw=1X
xk(w)Zzk(w)U |d〉)⊗ (⊗n+mw=n+1X
xk(w)Zzk(w)|eU 〉), (16)
where ⊗nw=1X
xk(w)Zzk(w)U |d〉 is the encrypted result. The client can decrypt it
successfully with the decryption key dk = (xk, zk).
Until now, we have described a QFHE scheme in the two sections. The scheme
is proposed based on a UQC, which is a combination of the quantum gates in
the set {X, Y, Z, H, P, CNOT, R}. These gates can be used to construct a
UQC which can realize any quantum transformation, thus our scheme has the
property of fully homomorphic.
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As an example, here introduce a construction of UQC, see Ref.[26]. This
UQC can realize a class of basic quantum transformations (named near-trivial
quantum transformation), and arbitrary quantum transformation U can be im-
plemented by a series of basic quantum transformation (for example, U1, . . . , UN )
in the class. Thus, based on the UQC, all these basic quantum transformations
U1, . . . , UN can be realized orderly, and finally the desired quantum transforma-
tion U is implemented. Note that, in order to implemented the transformation
U , the UQC should be carried out for N times.
Finally, it is worth to notice the following remarks.
– The QFHE scheme contains an interactive process: if the R gate occurs once
in the UQC, an interaction is needed.
– The random bits r, r′ selected in the interaction will be used in the key-
updating algorithm. Actually, these random bits can be chosen before the
encryption/evaluation/decryption. If there are nR R gates in the UQC, 2nR
random bits are necessary.
– The key-updating algorithm only depends on the construction of the UQC.
So, given a UQC, the key-updating algorithm can be completed before the
encryption/evaluation/decryption.
3.3 Analysis
We analyze the above QFHE scheme in this section. Because the QHE scheme
is a limited case of the QFHE scheme, it is easy to analyze the QHE, and the
analysis for the QFHE scheme is also suit for the QHE scheme.
The security is analyzed from two aspects: (1) the security of the keys, and
(2) the security of plain data and result.
Let’s firstly describe the whole process of the keys being used. The encryption
key ek is generated locally, and then be used in the QOTP encryption algorithm;
Next, according to the UQC, the key is updated by the key-updating algorithm,
and finally becomes to the decryption key dk, which is used in the decryption.
Because of the property of QOTP, its ciphertext would not leak any information
about the encryption key ek. In the whole process, the only step that may leak
information is the key-updating process. During the interaction process of key-
updating algorithm, when the server returns the wth qubit, the client carries
out a quantum operator XrZr
′
P xj−1(w) on it. Here, the random bits r, r′ are
locally selected, and the quantum operator represents that a QOTP encryption
is used after the execution of quantum gate P xj−1(w). In this way, the bit xj−1(w)
used in the interaction is protected and no information about the key is leaked.
Thus, all the keys (the encryption/decryption keys and the updating keys) are
perfectly secure.
Next, we analyze the security of plain data and result. The plain data is en-
crypted locally with the encryption key ek, and the encrypted data is input into
the UQC; After the quantum computation is completed, the encrypted result
is obtained; Finally, the plain result will be got through the QOTP decryption
with the key dk. According to our scheme, the data |d〉 and final result U |d〉
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remain in the encrypted states during the whole process of evaluation, such as
⊗nw=1X
x0(w)Zz0(w)|d〉 and ⊗nw=1X
xk(w)Zzk(w)U |d〉. Moreover, the intermediate
results also remain in the encrypted states, such as ⊗nw=1X
xj(w)Zzj(w)|ϕj〉 (Sup-
pose the intermediate result in the jth step is |ϕj〉 when the plain data is input
into the UQC). Because the keys are perfectly secure, according to the property
of QOTP, the plain data and result are also perfectly secure.
Then, we analyze the computational complexity of the algorithms in the
QFHE scheme, and the communication complexity in the process of interaction.
The encryption/decryption algorithms use the QOTP, so their computational
complexity are O(n). For the key generating algorithm, the key-updating algo-
rithm computing dk from ek can be synchronized with the execution of UQC,
and each step in the algorithm involves at most 3 additive operations, so the
computational complexity of key-updating algorithm is the same as that of the
evaluate algorithm. Denote |CU | as the circuit complexity (the number of quan-
tum gates) of the UQC. Given a quantum computational task, if the UQC should
be executed for N times, then the evaluate algorithm has computational com-
plexity |CU | ·N .
The interactive computation is only required in the evaluate algorithm of our
scheme. Once a R gate is executed, an interaction is needed: the server and the
client send one qubit to each other. Denote nR as the number of the R gates in
the UQC, then the communication complexity is 2nR ·N .
4 Discussions
In Ref. [23], we had presented a kind of QFHE scheme. There are some differences
between that scheme and the QFHE scheme in this paper. From the aspect of
the keys, the former scheme uses the same encryption key and decryption key,
but the decryption key in the latter scheme is different from the encryption
key. However, the latter scheme is not a public-key homomorphic encryption
scheme, since the encryption key cannot be public. From the aspect of evaluate
algorithm, the former scheme does not have any interaction and the executor of
the evaluate algorithm must know the encryption key, but it is not the case in
the latter. This difference makes the latter more suitable for the secure delegated
quantum computing between two parties.
Blind quantum computing is a kind of secure delegated quantum computing,
in which the server performs quantum computation following the client’s instruc-
tions and does not learn the client’s algorithm. Compared with blind quantum
computing, QFHE allows another kind of secure delegated quantum computing,
in which the algorithm may be provided by the server or be determined by both
the client and the server.
Our QFHE scheme is inspired by the TBQC scheme [24], and all the relations
in Eqs.(11,12,15) can be deduced directly from the relations in Ref. [24]. After
this work is completed, we find a similar research in Ref. [31], which proposed a
scheme for quantum computing on encrypted data. In their scheme, the server
must tell the client which algorithm (an algorithm means a series of quantum
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gates) is used to implement the quantum computation, then the client can update
the key accordingly. However, in our scheme, the client’s key-updating algorithm
only depends on the construction of the UQC, and is irrelevant with the server’s
algorithm.
5 Conclusions
This paper proposes a new kind of QFHE scheme based on the UQC. QOTP
is used in the encryption and decryption algorithm, and guarantees the perfect
security. In the scheme, the encryption key and the decryption key are different.
The encryption key is not public, and the decryption key can be computed from
the encryption key. In addition, some interactive computation is necessary in the
evaluate algorithm. The scheme is suitable for the delegated quantum computing
between two parties: the client uses the selected key to encrypt the plain data,
and sends the encrypted data to the server; then the server carries out quantum
computation on the encrypted data without any knowledge about the key, and
sends the encrypted result to the client; finally the client can decrypt it and
obtain the plain result.
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